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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT - EVOLUTION
OR REVOLUTION*
JoHN M. DALTONt
In considering the decisions of the Supreme Court, it is of utmost
importance that we attempt to place them in their proper perspective and
to study them calmly and dispassionately with the sense of history. I say
one should attempt to do this, because we are all a part of the world
around us and it is impossible for anyone to set himself wholly apart and
ignore the excitements and emotions of his own times. Yet, it may cause
one to ponder as to what may be the judgment of the future historians
when one reads in history of past controversies over Supreme Court
decisions and finds the same expressions as one hears today of disagree-
ment, anger, scorn, and even fears engendered by decisions which now are
virtually forgotten or are uniformly accepted as having been correct or
have been changed by law.
It is all to easy for us to become greatly aroused by, and bitterly
critical of, a decision of the court because of the circumstances and the
result in the particular case, without having any real knowledge of the
principles involved in the decision, and how they fit into the broad
pattern of our laws. Thus, for example, the fact that a decision results
in freeing of an alleged Communist who has been convicted of some
crime may cause much of the public to be up in arms, even though
another case involving basically the same legal questions might pass
virtually unnoticed and the decision might be generally accepted as
correct. This is the thing we must guard against.
It must be remembered that numerous provisions of the Constitution,
including some of those which are the most important, are couched in
broad general language which expresses basic principles which we accept
and think we understand, but which, actually, defy specific definition.
*This paper discussing the trend of the recent United States Supreme Court
decisions was prepared as an address delivered before an audience of students and
faculty at the University of Missouri, November 20, 1957. Of necessity, it does not
purport to give a comprehensive survey of the cases and is in rather general terms.
tAttorney General of Missouri.
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Thus, for example, "equal protection of the law", "due process", "freedom
of speech", and similar terms are concepts upon which there is general
agreement, but are ones as to which there may be vast disagreement as
to their exact meaning and application in the light of particular factual
situations. The meaning of these terms necessarily has been developed
since the founding of our nation, and will continue to be developed in
the future by decisions of the Supreme Court. Too often there is a
tendency to think of the Constitution as a document which has a firm,
fixed meaning within the limits of which there is no room for differences
of opinion. Instead, in many respects, it is a highly flexible document.
This flexibility and its adaptability to changing circumstances, without
departing from the fundamental principles upon which our nation was
founded has, in fact, been an important element in the development of
our nation.
We must also remember that the trend of decisions of the Court tends
to reflect the circumstances and conditions of the times in which they are
rendered. In the first place, the issues which reach the Court may be
greatly affected by what is going on outside the judicial system. Thus,
for example, in the 1930's, with the enactment of the so-called new
deal legislation, much of which was prompted by the conditions of the
depression period, it was inevitable that there should come before the
Court numerous cases of great moment involving the extent of the
powers delegated to the federal government.
Not only are the kinds of cases which come before the Court affected
by the circumstances and conditions of the times, but also the opinions of
the judges themselves are bound to be affected by them. Seldom do cases
reach the Supreme Court unless there is a good basis for argument on
both sides, and the thinking of the judges, who after all are only human
beings like the rest of us, is bound to be affected by their experiences and
enviroment.
To say that the Court is a mere servant of the law, guided solely by
established legal precepts and principles, would be naive. From the
lawyer's standpoint, it is desirable to have stable guide-posts to aid in
advising clients concerning their legal rights. The fact remains, however,
that the law is never static, and there is nothing new or novel in our
courts making new law by their decisions and changing their concepts of
the law through the passing years. The whole body of our English and
American common law, which is fundamental in our legal system, is made
1958]
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up of court-made law. Considering the field in which it operates and the
nature of its powers, it is not surprising that the United States Supreme
Court perhaps looks less to precedents and is more inclined to develop
new ideas and principles with respect to the law than other courts.
Chief Justice Marshall, in 1824, expressed the view that "courts
are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing."' However,
from the record, one may doubt that he thought the law was something
never changing and that the courts did not play a part in the creating of
the law. One may question whether he would have differed greatly from
those, for example, Hughes and Holmes, who have evaluated the Court
more realistically and recognized that it is a definite participant in the
formulation of public policy and, in Hughes' words, concluded that "the
Constitution is what the judges say it is."2 Time Magazine, in the summer
of 1956, informed its readers that the present Chief Justice "views his
role as 'steering the law' rather than being steered by it."'3
With nine men on the Court, with differing backgrounds of education,
environment and experience, possessing divergent social, political and
philosophical views, we cannot hope to find at any given time in our
history undeviating paths being followed in the decisions of that body.
Rather, the most that we can hope to discover is a trend in a certain
direction.
Many writers on the subject have analyzed the decisions of the Court
in the period from 1890 to 1937 as reflecting a predominant concern with
property rights and the economic institutions of the nation. Beginning
with the latter year, there apparently was an awakening to the world
situation and the threat of the destruction of the ideal of the individual
liberties of man so long cherished in this country. Consequently, the
decisions of the Court from that time to the present reflect a primary
concern with the protection of what has been referred to generically as
the civil rights of the individual and the dignity of man.
The issue of civil liberties has long been the concern of all branches
of our government-legislative, executive and judicial. Among the most
frequently discussed cases in this area are the segregation cases, decided
1. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) *738, *866 (1824).
2. HUGHES, ADDRESSES Ax PAr sS 139 (1908).
3. Time Magazine, June 25, 1956, p. 15.
[Vol. 23
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in 1954 and 1955. This is not the time nor place to discuss the merits of
the Court's action, but the cases in this field are an excellent example of
the changing views of the Court on a particular subject.
In the Plessy v. Ferguson case,4 the Court in 1896 established the
separate but equal doctrine in transportation which received tacit
approval in public education. In 1954, the Court rejected the separate but
equal doctrine as applied to the field of public education, and subsequent
decisions have rejected the application of the doctrine in other fields,
including transportation.
The forerunner of the Plessy v. Ferguson case was an early Mas-
sachusetts case, Roberts v. Boston,5 decided in 1850. It is interesting to
note that the decision of the Court in 1954 bears a striking resemblance
to the argument propounded in the Roberts v. Boston case by Charles
Sumner, counsel for the losing side. In that case, Sumner argued that
the separate school is not an equivalent for mixed schools since it
brands a whole race with the stigma of inferiority and degradation in
violation of equality of all men before the law. Compare this with the
language of the Supreme Court in 1954:
To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as
to their status in the community that may affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone . . . Separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal.6
In the 1956 term of the United States Supreme Court there were
many cases involving civil liberties, several of which attracted wide
attention and caused public concern. Because of the limitations of time
only a few of these will be mentioned.
In the Jencks case..7 the Supreme Court, by a loosely written
decision, held that, where undercover agents had testified, the Justice
Department would be required to allow the defendants to inspect the
reports made by such undercover agents to the F.B.I. The careless
language in this opinion led to widespread misunderstanding. Under
the urging of J. Edgar Hoover and others, Congress quickly enacted a
4. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
5. 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1850).
6. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
7. Jencks v. United States, 353 US. 657 (1957).
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statute setting out with clarity and definiteness what files were to be
produced. This restricted the effect of the Jencks case.
In contrast the case of Roviaro v. United States," involving a con-
viction for violation of the narcotics law was equally as far-reaching but
did not cause any unusual clamor.
In the Watkins case 9 the defendant refused to answer questions of
the Un-American Activities Committee, and in the Sweezy case10 the
witness refused to answer questions in a state subversive activities in-
vestigation. In these two cases, the Court, in reversing convictions for
contempt, emphasized the protection given by the first amendment to the
individual freedoms of speech, press, religion, political beliefs and
association. The Court stated that, before such freedoms can be infringed
upon, it must be clearly shown that the government had a legitimate
interest in seeking the information which the questions were designed to
elicit.
In the Konigsberg case" the State Bar of California denied the
application of plaintiff to practice law because he failed to show good
moral character. The Court held that there was no basis from the facts to
find that the plaintiff did not have good moral character and that his
refusal to answer questions as to membership in or support of the Com-
munist party could not form a basis for such holding.
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Harlan said:
But what the court has really done.., is to impose on California
its own notions of public policy and judgment. For me, today's
decision represents an unacceptable intrusion into a matter of
state concern.'
2
In the Yates case' 3 the defendant was convicted in a federal trial
court of the violation of the Smith Anti-Communist Act by advocating
the overthrow of the government by force and by organizing the Com-
munist party which advocated and taught the overthrow of the govern-
ment by force. In a divided opinion, the Court held that the trial court
8. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
9. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
10. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
11. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
12. Id. at 312.
13. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
[Vol. 23
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erred in allowing a finding of guilt for advocating the overthrow of the
government by force as an abstract principle. Rather, the Court required
a finding that the defendant advocated action rather than an abstract
principle before a conviction could be had.
Caryl Chessman was convicted in California in 1948 and sentenced to
death. Innumerable appeals, writs of error and writs of habeas corpus
have been filed in many courts. His sentence has never been executed.
On five occasions between 1950 and 1954 Chessman petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for writs of certiorari to review various decisions
adverse to him. One of these adverse decisions was the California
supreme court's affirmance of Chessman's conviction. On each occassion,
certiorari was denied.14 Finally, however, certiorari was granted, and on
June 10, 1957 the Court held that there was grave question as to the
correctness of the transcript of testimony upon which the appeal of his
conviction had been considered, and that it was a violation of due process
when the lower court, in a hearing on objections to the transcript of
evidence, refused to allow the defendant to be personally present or to
provide for his representation by counsel.' 5
Whether one agrees with the decisions of these and many other cases
involving civil liberties, they do indicate that the Court desires to em-
phasize its concept of individual liberties guaranteed to all citizens of the
United States by the Federal Constitution, and that, in the thinking of
the times, the rights of individual citizens should be carefully protected,
with the Bill of Rights of the Constitution being given broad meaning and
effect in light of existing social and international situations.
Other widely discussed cases are those involving federal-state rela-
tions. Among these are the cases involving the application of the pre-
emption doctrine. An outstanding example of these cases is Pennsylvania
v. Nelson.10 Steve Nelson was convicted in the state courts of Penn-
sylvania for subversive activities. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
reversed the decision on the grounds that the federal government had
pre-empted the field of subversive activities and superseded state legisla-
tion in the field of sedition, and that therefore the state was without
14. For a complete history of the Chessman litigation, including a full discussion
of the denials and grants of certiorari, see the appendix to Mr. Justice Douglas' dis-
senting opinion in Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156, 173 (1957).
15. Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 (1957).
16. 350 U.S. 495 (1956).
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jurisdiction to proceed against the defendant under the state's sedition
act. The United States Supreme Court affirmed this and pointed out that
the enforcement of state laws in this field would present a serious threat
of conflict with federal activities in regulating sedition. Four justices
dissented in an opinion stating that the facts of the case did not call for
application of the principles relied on by the majority opinion and that,
under the facts, the doctrine of pre-emption did not apply.
The area of state authority in labor-management relations has also
been singularly affected by the application of the pre-emption doctrine.
In the exercise of its power to regulate commerce among the states,
Congress has enacted the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, and
later the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, popularly known as
the Taft-Hartley Act. While recognizing that those enactments leave
"much to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how
much,"'17 the Court has attributed to Congress an exercise of judgment
"in favor of uniformity"' 8 in labor-management relations in industries
engaged in or affecting interstate commerce and has held invalid numer-
ous state efforts at regulation which it found to invade a field which
federal legislation has pre-empted.
Thus, in Hill v. Florida'0 the Court struck down a Florida statute
imposing numerous conditions and restrictions upon the right of labor to
organize and to bargain collectively. In the case of Bethlehem Steel Co.
v. New York Labor Relations Board2" the Court rejected the idea that
concurrent state and federal action in the area of labor relations is per-
missible. A Michigan statute requiring a majority approval of strike
action was held invalid as applied to industries subject to federal legisla-
tion21 . A Wisconsin statute prohibiting strikes by employees of public
utilities and providing compulsory arbitration of labor disputes between
utilities and their employees was held invalid by the Supreme Court
because of its conflict with federal legislation. 22
17. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953).
18. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1, 11 (1957).
19. 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
20. 330 U.S. 760 (1946).
21. International Union of United Automobile Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454
(1950).
22. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Railway Employees v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board, 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
[Vol. 23
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At its most recent session, the Supreme Court again extended the
application of the pre-emption doctrine in the regulation of labor-manage-
ment relations. In three cases,23 the Court held that, in matters of
unfair labor practices in industries subject to federal law, exclusive juris-
dicition has been conferred upon the National Labor Relations Board.
The Supreme Court held that state courts and administrative agencies
were precluded from affording relief in such matters, although the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board had declined to accept jurisdiction of the
controversies. These decisions have left a broad no-man's land in the
regulation of labor-management relations in industries which are subject
to the federal acts but which fail to meet the jurisdictional standards
promulgated by the National Labor Relations Board for its exercise of
the exclusive jurisdiction conferred upon it. Thus, there is no forum for
adjudication of disputes in some areas of labor relations.
The cases involving the application of the pre-emption doctrine show
that the Court has construed the legislation as evidencing Congress'
intent to pre-empt the field to a considerable extent for the sake of uni-
formity in the enforcement of laws pertaining to subversive activities
and labor-management relations. It has been suggested that Congress
express its intention in each of these enactments and thus remove this
from the Court's consideration.
We here in Missouri are directly concerned by the decisions of the
Court in the field of labor relations. In 1947, the Missouri General
Assembly enacted a law, generally known as the King-Thompson law,24
which has as its object the prevention in public utilities of strikes and
lockouts which jeopardize the public interest, health and walfare. Since
its enactment, the state has seized and operated numerous public utilities
where strikes had been threatened or had occurred. Under the King-
Thompson law, Missouri has had no prolonged strikes by employees of
public utilities.
The validity of the Missouri statute has, however, been challenged
by labor unions involved in disputes with Missouri public utility em-
ployers. At the present time, litigatioin is pending in the state and federal
23. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957); Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 US. 20 (1957); San Diego Building Trades
Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
24. §§ 295.010-.210, RSMo 1949.
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courts in which the validity of the King-Thompson Act is strenuously
challenged on the grounds that it attempts to operate in the field of labor-
management relations in industries in interstate commerce and that the
federal legislation has pre-empted such field to the exclusion of the states.
Many scholars believe that the trend of pre-emption cases and others
involving federal-state relations is toward a strong federal or central
government with consequent infringement and encroachment upon the
sovereignty of the several states. Opposition to such encoachment is
popularly referred to as state's rights, a much bantered, abused and
broadened term.
Historically, we must recall that the United States Constitution was
a delegation of powers to a federal government by a group of sovereign
states who reserved for themselves all powers not expressly granted to
the federal government.
State's rights has been a subject of recurring debates over our
nation's history. Certainly both great political parties have stressed it
time and time again, with quick reversals of position. Contrary to what
most people believe, the doctrine of state's rights is not sectional, but is
well supported in every portion of our country.
Many responsible people are concerned about the "nibbling away"
of the rights of various states, particularly when functions of our
democracy are transplanted to Washington, with less guidance and con-
trol by our people; and that trend would, if unchecked, cause all petitions
for redress to be transferred to a central government, far removed from
local scrutiny. The great danger is that we disregard such encroachment
on the rights of the state in order to secure a temporary advantage on
some current issue and overlook the fundamental dangers of the loss of
those rights.
Our Constitution divides our government into three divisions: the
legislative branch, which sets the policy by enactment of laws; the execu-
tive branch, which administers or executes the laws; and the judicial,
which interprets the laws.
A frequently mentioned suggestion is that these decisions are the
consequence of a contest between the three historic branches of our
government; and that a strong judiciary is asserting policy through its
interpretation of the Constitution and laws, and that actually this is an
invasion of the prerogatives of the legislative branch. Certainly strong
[Vol. 23
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individuals in one branch may, by power, intelligence, or fortitude, trans-
gress on the rights of another branch. Perhaps the founding fathers anti-
cipated this because of the elaborate system of checks and balances in
our Constitution to safeguard against encroachment. There is reason
to believe that, in due time, the pendulum will swing the other way, as
it has more than once in the past.
An independent judiciary is an essential part of our form of govern-
ment. Without it, a written Constitution would become meaningless and
wholly unenforceable. The Bill of Rights contained in the first ten
amendments to the Constitution would be just a set of moral standards to
be followed or disregarded at the whim of the legislative and executive
branches of the government. Without it, there would be no one to draw
the line between those powers which have been delegated to the national
government and those which have been reserved by the states. In a
sense, the Court occupies the position of an umpire-its decisions may
frequently be unpopular and, inevitably, it may make mistakes, but it is
essential that we have such an institution and when its decisions are
made that they be followed. The alternative is anarchy.
This does not mean that the decisions of the Court should never be
criticized. A fair discussion of the Court's action and the action of all
branches of our federal and state government is a part of our democratic
system. Discussion and criticism of the Court's decisions which may be.
deemed erroneous or unfortunate may lead to corrections through con-
stitutional amendments, new legislation, and even the modification of the
opinions of the Court as future cases involving similar situations come
before it.
It should be borne in mind that many of the decisions mentioned
have been by a divided court (5-4, 6-3, 7-2), and that a change of per-
sonnel may well change the decisions of the Court.
Perhaps decisions which may be considered revolutionary at the time
may well be accepted as evolutionary steps which are necessary in light
of changing social and economic conditions.
In conclusion, may I say that ordinarily the trends which appear to
be so controversial will, in due time, right themselves without great harm.
I have great faith in our Constitution and in the future of America, and in
the virility of our democracy and democratic institutions.
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